The Allais paradox is a choice problem designed by Maurice Allais (1953) to show an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. The Allais paradox demonstrates that individuals rarely make rational decisions consistently when required to do so immediately.
In decision theory and economics, ambiguity aversion (also known as uncertainty aversion) is a preference for known risks over unknown risks. An ambiguity-averse individual would rather choose an alternative where the probability distribution of the outcomes is known over one where the probabilities are unknown.
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result in social choice theory showing that no ranked-choice procedure for group decision-making can satisfy the requirements of rational choice. Specifically, American economist Kenneth Arrow showed no such rule can satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the principle that a choice between two alternatives A and B should not depend on the quality of some third, unrela
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the capability of computational systems to perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence, such as learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and decision-making. It is a field of research in computer science that develops and studies methods and software that enable machines to perceive their environment and use learning and intelligence to take actions that maximiz
In decision theory, economics, and probability theory, the Dutch book arguments are a set of results showing that agents must satisfy the axioms of rational choice to avoid a kind of self-contradiction called a Dutch book. A Dutch book, sometimes also called a money pump, is a set of bets that ensures a guaranteed loss, i.e., the gambler will lose money no matter what happens.
The decision-making paradox is a phenomenon related to decision-making and the quest for determining reliable decision-making methods. It was first described by Triantaphyllou, and has been recognized in the related literature as a fundamental paradox in multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) and decision analysis since then.
In decision theory, the Ellsberg paradox (or Ellsberg's paradox) is a paradox in which people's decisions are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. John Maynard Keynes published a version of the paradox in 1921.
Fredkin's paradox reads 'The more equally attractive two alternatives seem, the harder it can be to choose between them—no matter that, to the same degree, the choice can only matter less.' Thus, a decision-making agent might spend the most time on the least important decisions. It was proposed by American physicist Edward Fredkin.
The two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a paradox in probability theory. It is of special interest in decision theory and for the Bayesian interpretation of probability theory.
In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's problem, also known as Newcomb's paradox, is a thought experiment involving a decision problem where a player must decide whether to take one or two boxes in conditions where a being, often called the 'predictor', is able to predict his choices with near-certainty. Newcomb's paradox was created by William Newcomb of the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.
In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's problem, also known as Newcomb's paradox, is a thought experiment involving a decision problem where a player must decide whether to take one or two boxes in conditions where a being, often called the 'predictor', is able to predict his choices with near-certainty. Newcomb's paradox was created by William Newcomb of the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.
The Sleeping Beauty problem, also known as the Sleeping Beauty paradox, is a puzzle in decision theory in which an ideally rational epistemic agent is told she will be awoken from sleep either once or twice according to the toss of a coin. Each time she will have no memory of whether she has been awoken before, and is asked what her degree of belief that 'the outcome of the coin toss is Heads' ought to be when she is
The Sleeping Beauty problem, also known as the Sleeping Beauty paradox, is a puzzle in decision theory in which an ideally rational epistemic agent is told she will be awoken from sleep either once or twice according to the toss of a coin. Each time she will have no memory of whether she has been awoken before, and is asked what her degree of belief that 'the outcome of the coin toss is Heads' ought to be when she is
The two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a paradox in probability theory. It is of special interest in decision theory and for the Bayesian interpretation of probability theory.
Wollheim's paradox is a problem in political philosophy that points to an inherent contradiction in the concept of democracy. The paradox highlights the fact that a person can simultaneously advocate two conflicting policy options A and B, provided that the person believes that democratic decisions should be followed.